Abstract
This symposium focuses on Thinking and Perceiving by Dustin Stokes (2021), published by Routledge. In his précis, Stokes (2023a) provides an overview of the key arguments of his book, which lead to a new descriptive and normative account of the relationship between cognition and perception. Four commentaries examine the scope and implications of this account. Zoe Drayson (2023) and Christopher Mole (2023) examine the epistemological force of Stokes’s claims about the organisation of the human mind. Furthermore, the implications of philosophical and empirical research on object recognition are discussed by Aleksandra Mroczko-Wasowicz (2023) and on perceptual learning by Zed Adams (2023). The symposium concludes with a reply by Stokes to these commentaries (Stokes, 2023b).
References
Adams, Z. (2023). Varieties of perceptual improvement. Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, 4. https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2023.10264
Drayson, Z. (2023). Truth, success, and epistemology: A response to Stokes’s Thinking and Perceiving. Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, 4. https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2023.10250
Mole, C. (2023). Stokes’s malleability thesis and the normative grounding of propositional attitudes. Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, 4. https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2023.10226
Mroczko-Wasowicz, A. (2023). Perceptual expertise and object recognition: An explanatory task for modularists and antimodularists. Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, 4. https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2023.10247
Stokes, D. R. (2023a). Précis of Thinking and Perceiving. Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, 4. https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2023.10953
Stokes, D. R. (2023b). How radical is perceptual malleability? A reply to commentators. Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, 4. https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2023.10954
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