Stokes’s malleability thesis and the normative grounding of propositional attitudes





How to Cite

Mole, C. (2023). Stokes’s malleability thesis and the normative grounding of propositional attitudes. Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, 4. (Original work published July 5, 2023)


The position that Stokes’s Thinking and Perceiving aims to overthrow is committed to the idea that the facts about one’s propositional attitudes and the facts about one’s perceptual experiences are alike grounded in facts about representations (in various formats) that are being held in a short or long term memory store, so that computations can be performed upon them. Claims about modularity are claims about the distinctness of these memory stores, and of these representations. One way in which to reject those claims is to deny only that distinctness. A more radical way would be to reject the underlying idea that facts about perception and facts about propositional attitudes are alike grounded in facts about stored representations. Although the more radical approach might seem to face a problem concerning causal efficacy, I suggest that the way is open for Stokes to take it.


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Stokes, D. (2021). Thinking and perceiving: On the malleability of the mind. Routledge.

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