Reviving the naïve realist approach to memory

Versions

PDF

Keywords

Naive realism
Memory
Phenomenology
Perception
Representationalism
Relationalism

How to Cite

Reviving the naïve realist approach to memory. (2022). Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, 3. https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2022.9192

Abstract

The viability of a naïve realist theory of memory was a lively debate for philosophers of mind in the first half of the twentieth century. More recently, though, naïve realism has been largely abandoned as a non-starter in the memory literature, with representationalism being the standard view held by philosophers of memory. But rather than being carefully argued, the dismissal of naïve realism is an assumption that sits at the back of much recent theorizing in the philosophy of memory. In this paper, we identify three reasons why philosophers of memory have felt compelled to outright reject naïve realism. We argue that none of those reasons are successful. Thus, far from being a non-starter, we argue that naïve realism is a theoretical perspective that needs to be given serious consideration in current philosophy of memory debates.

PDF
Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Copyright (c) 2022 Michael Barkasi, André Sant'Anna