Abstract
In this paper, I re-elaborate some of the ideas presented in Why Delusions Matter (Bloomsbury 2023) in response to four commentaries on the book. My proposed conception of delusionality cuts across clinical and non-clinical contexts: an interpreter calls a speaker’s belief delusionalwhen the belief seems to be central to the speaker’s identity, but the interpreter finds it both implausible and unshakeable. Here I frame the emphasis on what all delusional beliefs have in common as an attempt to resist simplistic dichotomies about human agency. Ideal agents seek the truth and accurately represent the world, engaging with it in such a way as to further their goals, exercise control over themselves and the surrounding environment, and successfully coordinate with others. Human agents can sometimes rely on comforting illusions and constructed worlds to establish or restore a connection with other agents and the shared environment at challenging times. But coordination can fail, and control is always limited. Delusions are an expression of agency in the sense that they can be understood as a response to the epistemic and psychological needs of human agents. Delusions are meaningful and may contain germs of truth about the speaker. But they should be replaced when better strategies for engaging with the world become available to the speaker.
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