Abstract
Though De Brigard is generally classified as a simulationist, the relationship of his view to the various theories that have emerged in the simulationist-causalist debate has so far been unclear. He himself seems to think that he has now made that relationship clear: he is a simulationist, but the form of simulationism that he defends “dissolves the conflict” between simulationism and causalism. In this paper, we argue, in response to his recent book and to a recent paper that further develops some of the ideas proposed therein, first, that the view that De Brigard defends does not in fact dissolve the conflict between simulationism and causalism and, second, that he in fact has yet to take a clear stand with respect to the claim that distinguishes simulationism from causalism. While our focus throughout is on De Brigard, our discussion sheds light on the nature of the relationship between simulationism and causalism in general, reveals that certain causalists have, like De Brigard, failed to take a clear stand with respect to the claim that distinguishes simulationism from causalism, and raises more general issues about the nature and future of the simulationist-causalist debate.
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