Abstract
Molyneux addressed his question to Locke in two forms. The question that is most often discussed in the literature is the 1693 version–about whether a newly sighted man could distinguish a globe and a cube when they are presented to his sight alone. But in 1688, he asked whether this man could know which was the globe. While Locke and Molyneux probably thought this an unnecessary add-on, we argue that it changes the question. Locke had no account of how one could know a contingent singular fact by sight or by vision. We argue that we know in these ways by using a process of active sensory exploration that employs the modality in question. A new form of Molyneux’s question emerges from this understanding of perceptual knowledge. While the variety of sensory exploration methods within and across modalities raises considerable difficulties for a positive answer, the original question, like the later version, can ultimately be answered only by empirical investigation.
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