Abstract
Representationalism is the view that perceptual experience essentially involves being in a representational state and that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is exhausted in its representational content. In this paper, I argue that the representationalist’s Simple Answer to Molyneux’s question does not work because it has phenomenologically implausible consequences. Since intramodal representationalism has serious shortcomings, I suggest that the representationalist should opt for an intermodal approach. Moreover, I argue that intermodal representationalism is best supported by quality space theory so as to make sense of the claim that visual and tactile experiences of an object of a given shape differ in their representational content. On this view, the representationalist’s response to Molyneux’s question ultimately depends on whether the cross-modal calibration of quality spaces is innate or learned.
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