Relearning and remembering: A gradualist account


Source monitoring

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Relearning and remembering: A gradualist account. (2024). Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, 5.


Relearning and remembering are usually seen as two distinct cognitive processes in contemporary philosophy of memory. In particular, relearning is sometimes regarded as a kind of memory error. This paper aims to address two questions. First, is relearning a kind of memory error? Second, how to draw a distinction (if any) properly between relearning and remembering? My answer to the first question is a conditional ‘yes’—it depends on whether relearning can be falsidical and whether metacognitive monitoring counts as a part of memory process. My answer to the second question appeals to a gradualist account, according to which the distinction between relearning and remembering is not an absolute yes-or-no affair, but a matter of degrees.



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