Cryptanalysis of PMACx, PMAC2x, and SIVx
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.13154/tosc.v2017.i2.162-176Keywords:
Cryptanalysis, PMACx, PMAC2x, SIVx, provable securityAbstract
At CT-RSA 2017, List and Nandi proposed two variable input length pseudorandom functions (VI-PRFs) called PMACx and PMAC2x, and a deterministic authenticated encryption scheme called SIVx. These schemes use a tweakable block cipher (TBC) as the underlying primitive, and are provably secure up to the query complexity of 2n, where n denotes the block length of the TBC. In this paper, we falsify the provable security claims by presenting concrete attacks. We show that with the query complexity of O(2n/2), i.e., with the birthday complexity, PMACx, PMAC2x, and SIVx are all insecure.Published
2017-06-19
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Copyright (c) 2017 Kazuhiko Minematsu, Tetsu Iwata
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
How to Cite
Cryptanalysis of PMACx, PMAC2x, and SIVx. (2017). IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology, 2017(2), 162-176. https://doi.org/10.13154/tosc.v2017.i2.162-176