



Multimixer-128: Universal Keyed Hashing Based on Integer Multiplication

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 - $F_{\mathbf{K}}(\mathbf{M}) := F(\mathbf{M} + \mathbf{K})$




Figure: The parallelization of f : Parallel $[f]$ [FRD23]

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


Figure: $\mathbf{NH}_{\mathbf{K}}[\kappa, w] = \text{Parallel } [M[w]]$

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- Only for input differences of the type $(a, 0), (0, a), (a, a), (a, -a)$




Figure: Upper-bound of $\max_{\delta} DP_{M[16]}((a, b), \delta)$, $DP_{M[16]}((a, b), 0)$ vs. Number of differences

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


Figure: \mathcal{F} -128, the public function of Multimixer-128

- We prove for $\mathbf{Z} \neq \mathbf{0}$, $\text{IP}_{\mathcal{F}\text{-128}}(\mathbf{Z}) \ll \text{IP}_{\mathcal{F}\text{-128}}(\mathbf{0}) = \frac{2^{129}-1}{2^{256}} \leq 2^{-127} = \text{MIP}_{\mathcal{F}\text{-128}}$

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- For all other differences, $\text{DP}_{\mathcal{F}\text{-}128}((\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}), \Delta) \leq 2^{-160}$
- Thus, Multimixer-128 is ε - Δ universal with

$$\varepsilon = \max\{\text{MDP}_{\mathcal{F}\text{-}128}, \text{MIP}_{\mathcal{F}\text{-}128}\} = 2^{-127}$$

Implementation and Benchmarking Results

Algorithm	# ops. \ per 256-bit input		
	\times	$+$ mod 2^{32}	$+$ mod 2^{64}
$\mathbf{NH}_K^T[\kappa, 32, 4]$	16	32	16
Multimixer-128	8	20	8

Table: Comparison of # arithmetic operations

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Algorithm	# Instructions \ per 256-bit input	Input length in bytes		
		512	4096	32768
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Table: Performance on 32-bit ARMv7 Cortex-A processor in cycles per byte

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Thank you for your attention!

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