Holger Nehring

Peace Movements and Internationalism

Abstract

This article charts the history of (European) peace movements as agents of internationalism in the long twentieth century. It highlights the rather ambiguous relationship between national trends and internationalist aspirations within European peace movements and also highlights their broadly Eurocentric views of the meaning and practices of internationalism.

Keywords: *peace movements, pacifism, nationalism, internationalism, transnational history*

Introduction

The terms "peace movements" and "pacifism" describe a broad spectrum of positions, ranging from the absolute refusal to condone violence and force in personal, social and international relations over the rejection of the use of force in international affairs to more moderate demands for reforms of the international system. The term pacifism was first coined, as a normative concept, by the Frenchman Emile Arnaud in 1901 in order to establish a common ideological denomination for the various bourgeois movements that campaigned across Europe for a federation of states, for disarmament, or for international arbitration, and to put it on par with the other big -ism of the time: socialism. It was thus itself the product of growing transnational convergence and co-operation amongst European and North Atlantic peace movements. Ideologically speaking, the very concept of "peace" is directly related to transcending borders and establishing some kind of "global community," either, as in Christian (especially Methodist and Quaker), Hindu and Buddhist thinking as part of a cosmos, however defined, or as a corollary of Enlightenment ideas of a world unified by reason.[1]

1 A longer, more elaborate and differently accentuated version of this article is currently is contained in Stefan Berger/Holger Nehring (eds): Global Social Movements. A Survey, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2016. This paper goes back to the 2012 Historikertag in Mainz. Many thanks to the participants of our panel and the audience for many probing questions. I have also learned a lot from an engagement with Benjamin Ziemann's synthetic writings on peace movements, especially his 2009 article in Archiv für Sozialgeschichte which directly tackles some of the issues raised here.

DOI: 10.13154/mts.55.2016.93-112

It is, therefore, not surprising that peace movements have been amongst the most active transnational and global actors, and that pacifism is often seen as the paradigmatic representative of internationalism. The Austrian pacifist Alfred Hermann Fried, one of the founding fathers of the German peace movements, even published an "international travel guide" in 1908 whose purpose was to acquaint readers with the internationalist tendencies.[2]

Yet the history of peace movements as internationalist actors is not straightforward. Connections beyond borders might take place at different levels: organisation, direct contacts, as well as communication and observation about aims and forms of protest between countries and regions. And addressing local and national audiences might be at odds with demands for transnational or even global co-operation. Glenda Sluga has coined the phrase "internationalism in the age of nationalism" to describe this pattern, although she primarily considers forms of specifically *liberal* internationalism geared towards establishing some form of world governance.[3]

And issue with Glenda Sluga's approach is that there have been different forms of internationalism in competition with each other, each of them in uneasy relationship with developments in the non-European world. It therefore makes sense to conceive of pacifism and peace movements have been sites where different forms of internationalism have met and have been discussed: those coming from socialist circles and internationalism related to women in particular.[4] At the same time, while mainly European in focus, it is important to bear in mind the fact that these forms of European internationalism, by being directly related to an international system dominated by Europe, was co-produced by the presence of European imperial power structures.[5] Judy Wu has, with regard to the internationalism of women anti-Vietnam War campaigners, coined the concept of "radical orientalism" to capture the intermeshing of interactions across boundaries and internationalist visions on the one hand, with preconceived notions of an oriental "other".[6]

Wilhelm Janssen: Friede, in Otto Brunner/Werner Conze/Reinhart Koselleck (eds.): Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, vol. 2, Stuttgart 1975, pp. 543–591.

2 See the reference in Madeleine Herren: Internationale Organisationen seit 1865: Eine Globalgeschichte der internationalen Ordnung, Darmstadt 2009), p. 42.

3 Glenda Sluga: Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism, Philadelphia 2013.

4 See the contributions by Krista Cowman and Andreas Wirsching in this issue. On different forms of internationalism see: Perry Anderson: Internationalism: A Breviary, in: New Left Review 14 (March/April 2002), pp. 5–25.

5 Zine Magubane: Overlapping Territories and Intertwined Histories: Historical Sociology's Global Imagination, in: Julia Adams/Elisabeth S. Clemens/Ann Shola Orloff (eds.): Remaking Modernity: Politics, History, and Sociology, Durham 2005), pp. 92–108, here p. 101.

6 Judy Tzu-Chun Wu: Radicals on the Road: Internationalism, Orientalism, and Feminism during the Vietnam Era, Ithaca 2013), p. 4.

Against this backdrop, the focus of this essay will be rather narrow. While it acknowledges an overlap with peace activities within labour and women's movements,[7] the main focus in this essay is on movements that explicitly campaigned for "peace" as a social and political utopia. This is distinct from, say, socialist anti-militarism, whose main emphasis lies on a critique of the role of the military within society, culture and politics. The focus of this chapter, therefore comes to lie on the strands that Martin Ceadel has called pacifism, the complete rejection of violent means of conflict resolution in international and domestic affairs, and "pacific-ism", a more pragmatic approach that allows for the use of violence under specific circumstances, especially in the context of ending violence.[8] "Peace" meant different people at different places at different times. But nonetheless, the concept and activism related to it managed "to bridge differences and to achieve transnational solidarities."[9] Analysing peace movements as manifestations of internationalism therefore has to involve some attention to the cognitive or ideological contents of the campaigns as well as the networks on which they were based.[10]

"Patriotic Pacifism" in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries

Peace movements first emerged in Europe and North America in the early nineteenth century, with an increasing involvement of the bourgeois women's movement from the late nineteenth century onwards.[11] They had much in common with regard to their homogeneous male bourgeois appearance, their organisation and their means of communication through learned journals and pressure-group activity as well as the "education" of the general public. Their main forms of campaigning were the advocacy of education for peace through national and international congresses and the petitioning of

7 See the essays by Stefan Berger and Krista Cowman in this issue.
8 Martin Ceadel: Thinking about Peace and War, Oxford 1987.
9 Nico Slate: Colored Cosmopolitanism: The Shared Struggle for Freedom in the United States and India, Cambridge 2012, p. 2.
10 See from more theoretical perspectives Ron Eyerman/Andrew Jamison: Social Movements: A Cognitive Approach, Cambridge 1988; Mario Diani/Doug McAdam (eds): Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action, Oxford 2003; Margaret E. Keck/Kathryn Sikkink: Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics, Ithaca 1998.
11 See the overviews by W. H. van der Linden: The International Peace Movement 1815–1874, Amsterdam 1987; and Verdiana Grossi's Le Pacifisme Européen 1889–1914 (Brussels: Bruylant, 1994); and Jürgen Osterhammel, Die Verwandlung der Welt. Eine Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts, Munich 2009, pp. 729–733, to which the structure of this argument is indebted.

governments. This social homogeneity contributed to transnational communications via a broad spectrum of transnational peace literature and, in the wake of the 1848 Revolutions via international congresses (for instance Brussels, 1848; Paris, 1849; Manchester 1852) at which European peace movements delivered calls for a European peace order to their rulers.

The first peace societies of these "friends of peace" or "peace workers" were founded in North America and Britain in the mid-1810s in the wake of the mass experience of war following the French Revolution in 1789. They were closely linked to religious revivalism and came with a strong desire for social and personal moral reform. One of the first peace society was established as the New York Peace Society by the Connecticut teacher David Low Dodge together with a group of evangelical clergy and merchants. By that time, "Friends of peace" had already existed in Britain: they had been set up to protest against William Pitt Jr's intervention in the revolutionary wars and had close links to the revivalist William Wilberforce as well as to the Quakers. The first formal organisation of peace activism in Britain came with the foundation of the British Society for the Promotion of Permanent and Universal Peace.[12]

These societies grew substantially over the coming years and also began to establish national organisations, most prominently with the American Peace Society founded by William Ladd which increasingly emphasised the role of reason (as opposed to Christian religious belief) in resolving conflicts. This form of organising spread by example and through conscious translation to continental Europe over the course of the 1820s and 1830s, with the French *Société de la morale chrétienne* (founded in 1821) and the *Société de la paix de Génève* being the most prominent ones. Like the peace societies that sprung up elsewhere, though with a slightly different emphasis from Anglo-American peace societies they emphasised popular participation and liberalism in particular, campaigned for free trade as an insurance against the abuse of political and governmental power and thus became part of the broader campaign against the restauration that followed the Congress of Vienna. They organised a number of "International" (1843–1879) or "Universal Peace Congresses" (1889–1939, except for the period of the Fist World War). A key juncture for the growth of peace campaigning followed the European revolutions of 1848/9. In their campaigns, the "friends of peace" opposed the principles on which the system of states had been founded in 1815, namely the legitimacy of established monarchies and the silencing of political protests. Instead, they claimed that the basis of any "peace" came

12 David Cortright: Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas, Cambridge 2008, p. 27.

to lie in civil society rather than governmental power. At the same time, however, the peace congresses themselves emulated, in their choreography, the "scenic performance" of the Holy Alliance.[13]

A second phase of peace activism emerged across continental Europe in the context of the nation-building wars of the 1860s, 1870s and 1880s as well as the rise of the organised labour movement. In 1870, W. Randal Cremer founded the Workman's Peace Association, a pioneer amongst groups that stressed the dangers of excessive governmental military spending for social justice and domestic or social peace. On one side of the more liberal spectrum was the *Ligue internationale et permanente de la paix*, which was founded in Paris by the liberal economist Frédéric Passy emphasised the importance of political participation and liberal economic policies for the creation of peace: they would curb governmental corruption and thus allow for the international arbitration of conflicts.[14]

The *Ligue internationale de la paix et de la liberté*, by contrast, which was founded in Geneva in 1867 and remained in existence in 1939, did not merely emphasise nationally specific policies. It also campaigned for national liberation and self-determination as a solution to what it regarded as universal peace. Under the leadership of Charles Lemonnier and Edmond Potonié-Pierre, the *Ligue* took its cues from the radical Italian nationalist Giuseppe Garibaldi and the French writer Victor Hugo. For them, national liberation and "democracy" were linked, and they also came to support early forms of humanitarian intervention: wars that were supposed to create peace by bringing popular political participation and national self-determination. The name of the *Ligue*'s journal, *Les* États-*Unis d'Europe*, sums up the paradoxical nature of the universalism embodied in its campaigns for peace: it wanted to unite Europe by means of creating European nation-states all around as "democracies," still mostly conceptualised as limited to male and middle-class voters.

The key theme of the vast majority of these peace proposals was not to create a world state or a world federation. Rather, the peace campaigners wanted to establish a form of "internationalism" that was carried by the belief in the importance of international law and the belief in the power of reason to lead to sound proposals for international arbitration. Although there was a large variety of different internationalist proposals for peace, each with its own national context and resonance, they relied on norms of "civilization"

13 Thomas Hippler: From Nationalist Peace to Democratic War: The Peace Congresses in Paris (1849) and Geneva (1867), in: Thomas Hippler/Milos Vec (eds.): Paradoxes of Peace in 19th Century Europe, pp. 170–188, here pp. 171–173, quote p. 171.

14 David Cortright: Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas, p. 16.

and "rationality" which linked individual and governmental morality directly to the advancement of civilisation and thereby excluded many countries, especially outside Europe, from serious consideration.[15]

Following these examples, a series of peace societies was founded across continental Europe from the 1870s onwards.[16] In 1870, the first Dutch peace society (the Dutch Peace League) was founded, gaining a mass following after its merger with the Dutch section of the Women's International League for International Disarmament in the new organisation *Vrede door Recht*, which campaigned for the establishment of international legal norms and was inspired by the Dutch early-modern philosopher of international law Hugo Grotius.[17] 1887 saw the foundation of the *Unione lombarda per la pace* in Milan, leading to the creation of a national Italian association in 1889. In 1891, Bertha von Suttner founded the Austrian peace society. Her efforts inspired the revival of German peace campaigns, which had emerged in various German states over the course of the 1850s, but which had been faced with constant censorship and intimidation. In 1892, Alfred Hermann Fried helped found the German Peace Society (*Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft*), as a federal umbrella organisation for German peace campaigns.[18]

The cohesion of this nationally organised transnational community was further strengthened by the foundation of the International Peace Bureau in Bern (Switzerland) in 1892, which remained intact until the First World War.[19] While some early pacifists had advocated linking social concerns to demands for a peaceful international order, this linkage remained on the sidelines of nineteenth-century transnational peace organisations, despite the contribution of socialists and anarchists within the International League of Peace and Liberty. Although their remit was much narrower, organisations such as the Inter-Parliamentary Union (founded in Paris in 1888) and the Conciliation International (founded in 1905) also belonged to the spectrum of transnational pacifist activities.

These efforts to establish arbitration and international law as the key components of liberal peace campaigns highlighted the ambiguities of such positions, when the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 established international norms for conflict resolution through the establishment of an International Court of Arbitration and by establishing rules for warfare. European peace campaigns, and the international lawyers and politicians involved within them, played an important role in bringing the ideas for these conferences

15 The variety of these proposals and their links to liberal imperialism are brought out especially well by Caspar Sylvest: Continuity and Change on British Liberal Internationalism, c. 1900–1930, in: Review of International Studies 32:2 (2005), pp. 263–283.

16 The following overview follows David Cortright: Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas, pp. 39–40.

17 See Sandi E. Cooper (ed): Peace Activities in Belgium and the Netherlands, New York 1974.

18 Roger Chickering. Imperial Germany and a World without war. The Peace Movement and German Society, Princeton 1976.

19 Helmut Mauermann: Das international Friedensbüro 1892 bis 1950, Stuttgart 1990.

about and in propagating the aims and objectives.[20] But peace campaigners had strange bedfellows: Russian czar Nicholas II, by no means an epitome of liberal government and often condemned by peace campaigners for his "autocratic and militaristic policies," was the sponsor of the 1899 conference and used its proceedings for the purposes of Russian public diplomacy.[21]

During this time period, peace campaigning also began to emerge outside the European and trans-Atlantic core, mostly in connection with imperial reform efforts or in connection with the growth of liberalism and other agendas of modernisation in these countries. In Japan, for example, William Jones of the British Peace Society with his lectures there provided the impetus for the foundation of the first Japanese peace society, *Nihon heiwa-kai*, in 1889. Christian peace campaigning also existed in Japan. Most famous perhaps was Uchimura Kanzō. He had been a supporter of the war against China in 1894/5, but became an absolute non-violent pacifist in reaction to the violence and brutality he had seen there.[22]

What Sandi Cooper has termed "patriotic pacifism," a belief in nationhood and patriotism with the expectation that nation states should fit into the international legal system, sat uneasily with pacifists' transnational aims and forms of organisation well into the twentieth century; and it also sat uneasily with their campaigns for peace. With the exception of a minority of absolute pacifists, peace campaigners at the time were willing to tolerate war and violence under specific circumstances, specifically when it furthered what they regarded as national interests and national self-determination.[23] Towards the last third of the nineteenth century, the emphasis of peace campaigners had shifted from an advocacy of the establishment of nationally organised polities towards campaigning for the establishment of "contract-based popular sovereignty" within the context of nation states.[24]

As with the socialist anti-militarism within the context of the Socialist International, this paradoxical structure of campaigns against war did not emerge as a result of the First World War. It was deeply embedded in the ideas and practices of "peace" that the

20 Jost Dülffer: Regeln gegen den Krieg?: Die Haager Friedenskonferenzen 1899 und 1907 in der internationalen Politik, Frankfurt am Main 1981.

21 David Cortright: Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas, p. 40.

22 David Cortright: Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas, p. 29.

23 James Hinton: Protests and Visions: Peace Politics in Twentieth-Century Britain, London 1989.

24 Thomas Hippler: From Nationalist Peace to Democratic War: The Peace Congresses in Paris (1849) and Geneva (1867), p. 187.

movements developed from the 1860s onwards.[25] This also meant that many Western pacifists were often susceptible to the imperialist *zeitgeist* at the beginning of the twentieth century, thus alienating the few non-Western participants at transnational peace congresses.

Exclusionary processes did not only operate along national lines. Ideas of "peace" and transnational organisation were also shot through with inequalities of gender and political representation. We can see this especially clearly when considering the campaigns for peace within the International Council of Women (ICW). This "most influential women's organization" had, in 1899, included peace as one of the key components of its internationalism. Like other peace groups, its main focus was on campaigning for international arbitration, relying on the essentialised conceptualisation of women as especially suited for peace work. But in doing so, peace campaigners within the International Council of Women took little notice of the fact that their emphasis on "taming interstate relations within the Western world" and their aim to minimise "inter-imperial rivalry" stabilised "a world order based [upon] ongoing violence and systematic privilege of some actors over others" and tried to push aside the question of national self-determination, an issue that almost tore the organisation apart during the split of Norway from Sweden in 1905. And despite its emphasis on the universal reach of its ideals, many of its national groups opposed plans to transfer authority within the organisation towards the international level. Likewise, there was a heated debate about how to conceptualise popular sovereignty in the context of a politics of peace domestically: as a compromise solution the question of women's suffrage was simply taken as a separate matter from the debate about restrictive forms of political representations more generally. Increasingly, then, many within the International Council of Women began to focus no longer on a politics of peace, but campaigned for concrete policies to protect women as victims of war within the context of humanitarianism.[26] This was a view that gave rise to a specific form of more generalised humanitarian pacifism in Europe in the wake of the First World War, which forms part of the complex pre-history of the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948.[27]

25 Marc Mulholland: "Marxists of Strict Observance?": The Second International, National Defence, and the Question of War, in: Historical Journal 58:2 (2015), pp. 615–640, with references to the older literature.

26 Susan Zimmerman: The Politics of Exclusionary Inclusion: Peace Activism and the Struggle on International and Domestic Political Order in the International Council of Women, 1899–1914, in: Thomas Hippler/Milos Vec (eds.): Paradoxes of Peace in 19th Century Europe, pp. 189–215, quotes 189, p. 195. On women's peace politics during the First World War see: Annika Wilmers: Pazifismus in der internationalen Frauenbewegung (1914–1920): Handlungsspielräume, politische Konzeptionen und gesellschaftliche Auseinandersetzungen, Essen 2008.

27 Bruno Cabanes: The Great War and the Origins of Humanitarianism, 1918–1924, Cambridge 2014); Jay Winter/Antoine Prost: René Cassin and Human Rights: From the Great War to the Universal Declaration, Cambridge 2013.

These ambiguities and paradoxes also meant that most of the traditional transnational peace organisations did not survive the First World War unscathed.[28] This reconfiguration of peace campaigning away from the bourgeois associationalism that had characterised most of the nineteenth century was, however, not caused by the war, as has often been argued. The war merely accelerated a process of reflection that had been underway before, especially on the fringes of the absolute pacifist movements as well as the socialist anti-militarists. The war merely brought the tensions within the peace movements, which claimed universal ideas of peace for themselves, but embedded them in local and specifically national ideas of "civilization" into sharper relief. In particular, the emphasis that philanthropists such as Andrew Carnegie and peace campaigners had placed on the importance of international arbitration, culminating in the opening of the Palace of Peace in The Hague in 1913, just one year before the war, now seemed hollow:[29] the First World War had begun with a flagrant breach of international law with the German invasion and occupation of Belgium, and it saw a number of other breaches of the conventions of the war of law by Germany as well as the entente powers in Europe and beyond, such as the use of naval blockades, chemical warfare, and forced labour.[30]

"Governing the World?" Peace Movements, 1918–c.1950s

The period after the First World War was characterised by a break-up of the homogeneous peace movements and the rise of novel forms of transnational peace organisations. In particular, it revealed a split between reformist organisations who sought to build on the international legal expertise from the nineteenth century[31] as well as more radical forms of campaigning for peace, for example by highlighting the connections between peace and justice and campaigning for revolution. Religious organisations, in particular, campaigned for "the disarmament of hatred" after war and mutual reconciliation.[32]

28 For a brilliant overview see Martin Ceadel: Pacifism, in Jay Winter (ed.): The Cambridge History of the First World War, vol. 2, Cambridge 2014, pp. 576–605.

29 David Cortright: Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas, p. 43.

30 Isabel V. Hull: A Scrap of Paper: Breaking and Making International Law during the Great War, Ithaca 2014.

31 See Mark Mazower: Governing the World: The History of an Idea, London 2012, especially ch. 3 and 4. For France, see Peter Jackson: Beyond the Balance of Power: France and the Politics of National Security in the Era of the First World War, Cambridge 2013.

32 Gearóid Barry: The Disarmament of Hatred: Marc Sagnier: French Catholicism and the Legacy of the First World War, 1914–1945, Basingstoke 2012.

After the First World War had set in motion the process of decolonisation, the transnational pacifist organisations faced new challenges. They added members and national sections in Latin America, Asia, the Middle East and Africa, yet they did not shed their Eurocentric mindset and were hesitant to accept their non-European colleagues' notion that national liberation was the precondition for a stable international order. At the same time, they continued to campaign for the strengthening of international organisations, such as the recently established League of Nations. Prompted by the experience of mass combat during the Great War, a growing number of activists came to regard the nation state no longer as the basis of peace work. They instead began to search for alternative forms of international organisation by linking proposals for domestic political reform and the reorganisation of international politics in order to overcome the dilemmas of "patriotic pacifism."[33]

These views began to congeal around a more solid base for transnational links. A congress of women pacifists held in The Hague in 1915 led to the foundation of the International Women's League for Peace and Freedom in Zurich in 1919.[34] Most typical for the transnational organisation of the new peace movement was the foundation of the War Resisters' International (WRI), which had been originally founded under the name of "Paco" ("peace" in Esperanto) by the Dutch activist Kees Boeke in 1921.[35] The War Resisters' International entertained close links with the burgeoning peace and anti-colonial movements in Africa and Asia as well as with transnational socialist and religious bodies, such as the anarchist Anti-Militarist Bureau and the Christian International Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR).[36]

These new transnational organisations had national, regional and local branches across the world and thus created unique transnational clearing houses for pacifist ideas and forms of action, which were discussed in the organisations' journals and during personal visits and applied in the transnational campaigns against rearmament and fascism during the 1920s and 1930s. The War Resisters' International and the Christian International Fellowship of Reconciliation were crucial for acquainting European and north-American pacifists with Mohandas K. Gandhi's strategy of non-violent action in the Indian struggle for independence. Gandhi's vision of a non-violent society and non-violence as a form

33 Sandi E. Cooper: Patriotic Pacifism: Waging War on War in Europe, 1815–1914, New York 1991.

34 See Gertrude B. M. Tims: Pioneers for Peace: Women's International League for Peace and Freedom 1915–1965, Oxford 1980; as a case study see Catia Cecilia Confortini: How Matters: Women's International League for Peace and Freedom's Trips to the Middle East, 1931–1975, in: Peace& Change 38:3 (2013), pp. 284–309.

35 See Daniela Hooghiemstra: De geest in dit huis liefderijk: Het leven in De Werkplaats van Kees Boeke (1884–1966), Utrecht 2013.

36 Peter Brock/Nigel Young: Pacifism in the Twentieth Century, Toronto 1999, pp. 102–105.

of protest was itself the result of transnational diffusion.[37] Engaging with the work of the American writer Henry David Thoreau and the Russian novelist Tolstoy, Gandhi first linked their arguments for a non-violent life with demands for direct action in his campaign against the military draft in British-ruled South Africa in the early 1900s, building on the arguments of the Muslim spokesman Sheth Haji Habib. Gandhi modified the strategy as "*satyagraha*," a non-violent personal and national battle, after his return to India in 1915 and practiced it most famously in his 1930/1931 salt march campaigns.[38]

The Labour and Socialist International (LSI), established in 1919 in the Swiss city of Berne, supported the kind of liberal internationalism, often linked to imperialist ideas of "governing the world," embodied in the League of Nations. But they tried to fill what they regarded as the socialist ideal of a League of Nations with new life by engaging with the movements for national self-determination around the world and by engaging actively with the Indian National Congress, Egyptian and Latin American nationalists at their conferences from the 1930s onwards and aimed to achieve, towards the late 1930s as part of the Communist popular front campaigns, some form of "democratisation of international relations," striking "a balance between the ideas of Marx, Mazzini and Wilson," yet still restricted by the limits that "nationhood" posed to "transnational action."[39] Similarly, the liberal societies that campaigned in favour of the authority of the League of Nations in international affairs made the experience of "Internationalism in a divided world."[40] Such concepts appealed to many Western pacifists within the War Resisters' International and the Christian International Fellowship of Reconciliation well into the 1950s and 1960s. Thus, while the following years saw the demise of this brand of pacifist nationalism in India, ideas of non-violent civil disobedience gained currency amongst Western radical pacifists, such as the Americans Richard Gregg, Gene Sharp and Bayard Rustin, who visited India and introduced the strategy into transnational debates in both Europe and North America. This formed the basis for Martin Luther King's civil rights campaign, beginning in Montgomery, Alabama, in 1955 and 1956, and for discussions about non-violence among European activists in the 1950s and 1960s.

37 Devi Prasad: War is a Crime against Humanity: The Story of the War Resisters' International, London 2005. For the United States see Scott H. Bennett: Radical Pacifism: The War Resisters League and Gandhian Nonviolence in America, 1915–45, Syracuse 2003.

38 Sean Chabot/Jan Willem Duyvendak: Globalization and Transnational Diffusion between Social Movements: Reconceptualizing the Dissemination of the Gandhian Repertoire and the "Coming Out" Routine, in: Theory and Society 31:6 (2002), pp. 697–740.

39 Daniel Laqua: Democratic Politics and the League of Nations: The Labour and Socialist International as a Protagonist of Interwar Internationalism, in: Contemporary European History 24:2 (2015), pp. 175–192, quotes 192.

40 Thomas Richard Davies: Internationalism in a Divided World: The Experience of the International Federation of the League of Nations Societies, 1919–1939, in: Peace & Change 37:2 (2012), pp. 227–252; Thomas Richard Davies: The Possibilities of Transnational Activism: The Campaign for Disarmament between the World Wars, Leiden 2007.

At the same time, these developments in the wake of the revolutions of 1918/9 accentuated a division among peace activists further. The one strand followed a broadly liberal persuasion and focused on pressure group activities. It found its organisational form, for example, in the British League of Nations Union or the liberal wing of the German Peace Society around Ludwig Quidde. Especially in Scandinavia, such interpretations fed into versions of national identity that highlighted the importance of "peace" and "peaceful conflict resolution" as a key feature of political culture and foreign policy making, often crowding out the dark side of these policies, so that ideas that had remained within the realm of civil society could now also be found within governments.[41]

More radical socialist groups included the French *Ligue internationale des combattants de la paix* or the British Peace Pledge Union which organised a peace ballot in Britain in 1935. Christian peace groups often cut across these boundaries, engaging with both liberal and socialist strands.[42] The flagrant breaches of international law that occurred with the Italian invasion of Abyssinia (1935), National Socialist and Japanese expansion and remilitarisation and in the context of the Spanish Civil War between 1936 and 1939 disrupted both the practical campaigning and the moral-political foundations of European peace movements. German and Austrian pacifists faced prosecution, and peace campaigners in countries under threat from German invasion had to decide whether they wanted to oppose National Socialism with violence, or whether they continued in their advocacy of non-violent means of conflict resolution.[43]

Peace Movements in the Wake of Auschwitz and Hiroshima

In the period after the Second World War, peace movements had to cope with two major challenges. First, they had to confront the threat of global destruction posed by nuclear weapons in an international system characterised by the nuclear-arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States. Second, "pacifism" had become discredited as a political ideology in the West. Many now blamed the rise of aggressive nationalism and racism in Italy, Germany and Japan on the predominance of "pacifist" feelings during the 1930s, and as the Soviet Union converted advocacy of "peace" into one of its main

41 See the research report by Helge Pharo: Den norske fredstradisjonen – et forskningsprosjekt, in: Historisk Tidsskrift 84:2 (2005), pp. 239–255; Jon Lawrence: Forging a Peaceable Kingdom: War, Violence and the Fear of Brutalisation in Post-First World War Britain, in: Journal of Modern History 75:3 (2003), pp. 557–589.

42 Gearóid Barry: The Disarmament of Hatred: Marc Sagnier: French Catholicism and the Legacy of the First World War, 1914–1945.

43 Peter Brock/Nigel Young: Pacifism in the Twentieth Century, pp. 121–130; 151–220.

propaganda tools in the Cold War. This had begun in the 1930s with the peace campaigns organised by the Communist International in the context of the popular front and the launch of an International Peace Campaign in that context in March 1936.[44] If the nineteenth century saw the "origins of war prevention," as Martin Ceadel has argued[45], the period after the Second World War might well have seen its end: whereas peace movements could be said to have had clearly recognisable aims and whereas they tried to implement them as pressure groups trying to sway public opinion and thereby influence governments, peace campaigns after 1945 had less clearly defined aims and now primarily took the form of loosely organised networks, as social movements in the way that we know them today.

Most peace activists were now longer concerned with preventing war as such. They tied their ideas to broader ideas of security and participatory citizenship that was borne by a fundamental distrust of governments to wage wars, which derived its powerful force from the experiences and memories of the bombing wars between 1939 and 1945, especially in Britain, West Germany, and Japan.[46] Despite the continued significance of the War Resisters' International and the Christian International Fellowship of Reconciliation for the transfer of non-violent direct action from India to Europe and North America, the relative importance of organised transnational peace efforts declined. For historians of peace movements as global social movements, it might be most helpful to analyse "pacifism" after the Second World War not in organisational or ideological terms, but as social movements, loose networks of activists who framed the problem of armaments in peculiar ways and who campaigned for very specific issues, such as for nuclear disarmament and against the American war in Vietnam.[47] Recent research has highlighted that, despite the importance of communist concepts of peace for the movements of the 1950s and 1960s, their influence was denied by mainstream campaigners fearful of facing even more

44 Thomas Richard Davies: NGOs: A New History of Transnational Civil Society, London 2013, pp. 116–117.

45 Martin Ceadel: The Origins of War Prevention: The British Peace Movement and International Relations, 1730–1854, published online in October 2011.

46 See Holger Nehring: Politics of Security. British and West German Protest Movements and the Early Cold War, 1945–1970, Oxford 2013; Mari Yamamoto: Grassroots Pacifism in Post-war Japan: The Rebirth of a Nation, London 2004.

47 See Charles DeBenedetti/Charles Chatfield: An American Ordeal: Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era, Syracuse 1990 and Alice Echols: "Women Power" and Women's Liberation: Exploring the Relationship Between the Antiwar Movement and the Women's Liberation Movement, in: Melvin Small/William Hoover (eds.): Give Peace A Chance: Exploring the Vietnam Antiwar Movement, Syracuse 1992, pp. 171–181.

recriminations in the anti-communist climate at the time.[48] Such exclusions also affected the peace campaigns by women: the gendering of the critique of peace activism often overlapped with anti-communism.[49]

The rifts this caused by Cold War polarisation become evident when examining the decline of the Japanese World Conferences against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (*Gensuikyō*), which began to gain ground as a focal point for a non-aligned global anti-nuclear-weapons movement in 1955, but rapidly lost its transnational cachet when it appeared to be hi-jacked by communists for propaganda purposes in the early 1960s.[50] In some contexts outside the European context, peace campaigning did not take the form of social movement activism, but focused primarily on the language as a means of overcoming enmity and creating "peace." Sandwiched between the demands of Japanese hegemonic foreign policy discourse and United States imperialism, peace activism against the United States presence on the Japanese island of Okinawa sought to highlight the power of subversive language and laughter to undermine the authority of those in power rather than direct political organising.[51]

Although such peace movements established links with pre-existing pacifist organisations and related campaigns, such as the civil-rights movement in the United States, their global connections were primarily characterised by intensified mutual observation, aided by the rising importance of the mass media in the political process in both Western and non-Western societies and bolstered by their common concerns for a world community. On the one hand, these efforts were less sustained than those of previous transnational organisations. On the other hand, however, the movements' loose and often spontaneous character made it much easier to translate global issues into local concerns and to transfer protest forms which were successful elsewhere.

The most important exceptions to this trend away from a politics of peace towards a politics of security were the communist-dominated World Peace Council (WPC), founded in the late 1940s as part of the Soviet Union's efforts at cultural diplomacy, and the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs which, following an initiative by the physicist Albert Schweitzer and the philosopher Bertrand Russell in 1955, brought

48 Robbie Lieberman: The Strangest Dream: Communism, Anticommunism and the U.S. Peace Movement 1945–1963, Syracuse 2000.

49 See, for example, Belinda Davis: Political Participation and Gender: Lessons from the Cold War, in: Joanna Regulska/Bonnie Smith (eds.): Women and Gender in Postwar Europe: From Cold War to European Union, New York 2012, pp. 139–55.

50 See Volker Fuhrt: Pazifismus in Japan – ein Auslaufmodell?, in: Mitteilungsblatt des Instituts für soziale Bewegungen 32 (2004), pp. 159–173; Mari Yamamoto: Grassroots Pacifism in Post-war Japan: The Rebirth of a Nation.

51 Yoshinobu Ota: Appropriating Media, Resisting Power: Representations of Hybrid Identities in Okinawan Popular Culture, in Richard G. Fox/Orin Starn (eds.): Between Resistance and Revolution: Cultural Politics and Social Protest, New York 1997, pp. 145–170.

together scientists across the blocs to tackle the issue of arms control from the late 1950s onwards. Pugwash played a major role in reinforcing reformist trends within the fledgling Soviet Union during the 1980s.[52]

By contrast, the campaigns against nuclear weapons in Europe during the 1950s and 1960s and again during heightened Cold War tensions in the early 1980s rarely established transnational campaign organisations and continued to frame their demands in terms of national and even local concerns. While there were some transnational organisations their geographical scope remained restricted to Europe, such as the group European Nuclear Disarmament co-founded by the British social historian E. P. Thompson.[53]

The first campaigns did not emerge on a large scale until the late 1950s and they followed heightened concerns across the world about the dangers of radioactivity coming from nuclear testing, following a number of accidents and the campaigns by scientists. The American campaign SANE was founded in 1957 by a number of writers and public intellectuals.[54] Likewise, the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament was founded in 1958 by an Anglican clergyman, a journalist and a number of public intellectuals. In West Germany, anti-nuclear weapons protests started as party-political campaigns organised by the social-democratic party, but soon took on a life of their own in the Easter March movement.[55] In Japan, the only country in the world who experienced the dropping of two atomic bombs in the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, "peace" had been enshrined in the constitution of the new democratic country, so that the anti-nuclear weapons protests focused primarily on the nature of Japan's relationship with the United States and was tied up with a fundamental critique of the Japanese political system.[56] The key theme, supported by many local governments, was Japan's unique historical experience that endowed the country with a special mission to create world peace.[57]

52 See Günter Wernicke: The Communist-Led World Peace Council and the Western Peace Movements: The Fetters of Bipolarity and Some Attempts to Break Them in the Fifties and Early Sixties, in: Peace & Change 23:3 1998, pp. 265–311; Timothy Johnston: Peace or Pacifism?: The Soviet "Struggle for Peace in All the World", 1948–1954, in: Slavic and East European Review 86:2 (2008), pp. 259–282; Alison Kraft/Holger Nehring/Carola Sachse: The Pugwash Movement and the Global Cold War, theme issue, in: Journal of Cold War Studies (2016) (forthcoming). For country-specific studies, see the case study for Norway: Lars Rowe: "Nyttige idioter?": Fredsfronteni Norge, 1949–1956, Oslo 2002.

53 Patrick D. M. Burke: European Nuclear Disarmament: A Study of Transnational Social Movement Strategy, PhD diss., University of Westminster 2004.

54 Milton S. Katz: Ban the Bomb: A History of SANE, the Committee for a sane nuclear policy, 1957–1985, New York 1986.

55 Holger Nehring: Politics of Security.

56 See Mari Yamamoto: Grassroots Pacifism in Post-war Japan: The Rebirth of a Nation and Jennifer M. Miller: Fractured Alliance: Anti-Base Protests and Postwar U.S.-Japanese Relations, in: Diplomatic History 38:5 (2014), pp. 953–986.

57 Lisa Yoneyama: Hiroshima Traces: Time, Space, and the Dialectics of Memory, Berkeley 1999.

Hence, although nuclear weapons encouraged peace campaigners to link their local and national campaigns to global concerns, following the slogan "One World or None" that some American arms control advocates had coined immediately after the Second World War[58], the differences between communism and anti-communism remained divisive. Moreover, the images of war from which most peace activists developed their ideas of peace were still essentially based on experiences and memories of the bombing wars of 1939 to 1945, rather than a global nuclear confrontation, which was hard to imagine without any concrete empirical evidence.

Similarly, the legacy of imperialism and colonialism made global co-operation difficult and prevented more effective forms of co-operation. Whereas British activists saw themselves as the natural neutral mediators between Europe and the post-colonial world, linking United States peace activists with those from Ghana and other African states in the late 1950s and early 1960s, this proved very difficult in practice. The suggestion by African activists to tie what they regarded as the "nuclear imperialism" of France's testing in Sahara desert with developments in Algeria and link this to a message of pan-African nationalism, this proved extremely divisive. Thus, while both African, US and European peace activists drew on similar languages of peace and justice, and while they managed to form some kind of links, the geopolitics of the Cold War and the reality of post-colonial nationalism and state-building worked against a more sustained co-operation, as different versions of modernity clashed, especially as the reality of statehood worked against the dream of pan-African union that the Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah had wished to achieve by linking peace campaigns with pan-Africanism. So, while these campaigns created new forms of links and participation, they also gave rise to new divisions.[59]

While direct and organised transnational contacts and protest events remained the exception from the 1960s onwards, movement activists continued to frame their campaigns more pronouncedly and explicitly as ones that transcended national borders and continued to engage with the campaign strategies of non-Western movements in particular. The protests against the American intervention in Vietnam which swept the Western world and Japan from the mid-1960s to the early 1970s increasingly engaged with strategies first developed by Latin American socialists, such as Fidel Castro and Che

58 See Fritz Bartel: Surviving the Years of Grace: The Atomic Bomb and the Specter of World Government, 1945–1950, in: Diplomatic History 39: 2 (2015), pp. 275–302.

59 Rob Skinner: Bombs and Border Crossings: Peace Activist Networks and the Post-Colonial State in Africa, 1959–62, in: Journal of Contemporary History (2015) (forthcoming); Jean Allman: Nuclear Imperialism and the Pan-African Struggle for Peace and Freedom Ghana, 1959–1962, in: Souls 10:2 (2008), pp. 83–102 and Quinn Slobodian: Foreign Front: Third World Politics in Sixties West Germany, Durham 2012.

Guevara, and with Maoism, most famously at the Berlin International Vietnam Congress in 1968. Quite controversially, advocates of such strategies argued that violence might be necessary for the creation of a durable peace.[60]

In the period since the 1960s, the nation lost much its importance as an identity space for peace protesters, especially in the Western world. Thus transnational communication, especially mediated through the ecumenical bodies of the Christian Churches, such as the Catholic *Pax Christi* and the All-Christian Peace Assemblies, helped bridge the Iron Curtain in the late 1970s and provided crucial support and communication networks for the emergence of an independent (that is: non-communist), peace movement in Eastern Europe during the 1980s. Given the importance of Hindu, Buddhist and, more specifically, Gandhian ideas about peace and social action for Western peace movements since 1945, it is striking that indigenous transnational campaigns in non-Western settings remained rather weak, as nationalism, anti-imperialism and state-building efforts continued to influence the ways in which "peace" was conceptualised there.

Conclusions

Overall, then, we can see five main themes in the history of peace movements as sites of internationalism. First, we have observed the transformation of the organisational *forms* of peace campaigning: in the late nineteenth century we saw primarily middle-class organisations that sought to create ideal types of Habermas' public sphere in order to further rational dialogue and thus create the preconditions for the creation of peace in the international arena through rational negotiations amongst rational enlightened actors; after 1945, peace activism primarily took the shape of social movement activism in the period after 1945, with social movements being networks of networks of activists that do have some form or organisation in terms of an address in society, but much more dynamic and loosely organised social formations.

Second, this transformation of forms was accompanied by a *transformation of the meaning* of cross-border exchanges: from a form of cross-border exchanges in a time period in which national boundaries were still by and large influx and were internationalism was essentially a fiction of a peaceful order that would precisely be peaceful because it was organised along clearly delineated nation-state lines; towards inter-nationalism that focused on the relationship between nation-states once this order had been created around the 1880s; towards trans-national exchanges that were characterised, if we follow the

60 See, for instance, the case of Italy sketched out by Massimo di Giuseppe and Giorgio Vecchio: Die Friedensbewegungen in Italien, in: Mitteilungsblatt des Instituts für soziale Bewegungen 32 (2004), pp. 131–157.

influential definition by Patricia Clavin who, in turn, follows Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, primarily non-governmental and societal actors that communicated, protested or otherwise acted across boundaries.[61]

Third, in terms of the *framing* of peace, we find a gradual shift from an emphasis on regulating international relations and creating norms of international law as the precondition of peace defined as international stability towards more inclusive, but also more expansive framing of "peace" that highlight peace as a mode of societal transformation and of movement.[62]

Fourth, there has been a growing emphasis on the transformation of the individual and the self for the creation of a sustained peace. "Peace" came to be seen increasingly as a non-violent practice and action starting with *individual*, as opposed to policy, changes in thought and action. Peace movements were the spaces in which these transformations could occur: peace itself came to be seen as movement, and the movement was the pre-figuration of a future peace.[63] This definition now made a direct reflection upon trans- and international as well as global approaches to peace campaigning obsolescent. Peace movements now directly represented internationalism; the connection went directly from local to the international or global. This transformation has, however, never been complete or teleological. The most recent peace campaigns, against the US-led interventions in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s as well as in Afghanistan and Iraq after 9/11 have revived traditional pacifist interests in international law and legal regulation of international affairs, as the more recent debates about non-enemy combatants and the role of the United Nations in legitimising military interventions have demonstrated.

Fifth, in terms of *context*, this chapter suggests that one of the main driving influences behind peace movements' internationalism was their assessment or framing of the kind of war and the kind of violence they opposed. Pacifists in the early twentieth century relied on an understanding of war rooted in the cabinet wars of the nineteenth century; the experiences of violence in the First World War made such views implausible and led to a more direct engagement with military violence and personal and national victimhood. This framing survived the Second World War and continued into the 1970s. It was only then that peace movement activists re-framed their activities as being concerned with making visible the otherwise invisible threat of a war that had not yet happened and an arms race that was *potentially* lethal. They therefore did not stress the existing physical violence of the arms race, but the structural violence of fears of war. The globalism or internationalism of peace movements was therefore always dialectically connected to

61 Patricia Clavin: Defining Transnationalism, in: Contemporary European History 14:4 (2005), pp. 421–439.

62 For Germany, see Benjamin Ziemann: The Code of Protest: Images of Peace in the West German Peace Movements, 1945–1990, in: Contemporary European History 17:2 (2008), pp. 237–261, 252–256.

63 Ibid.: pp. 257–259.

broader societal debates about war and violence. It is this dialectic to which historians of peace movements as social movements that crossed borders might pay more attention to in the future.

It is important to bear in mind, however, that these transformation was never complete and did not simply occur as a process of one-dimensional modernisation, but that they primarily added new dimensions to pre-existing structures while never dissolving them. Peace movements continue to be primarily affairs of the educated middle-class, and some elements of the traditional emphasis on exclusionary norms of civility and bourgeois associationalism remain to the present day.[64]

Instead of taking the internationalism in peace movements over the last two centuries for granted, this essay has argued for the need of historicisation in the vein of what the sociologist Peggy Somers has called the "historical sociology of concept formation."[65] It is not only through the constant reflection on the changing nature of peace campaigning in its ideologies, forms, and goals, but also in the continuous historicisation of the very concepts we use to describe these processes that we will be able to see the blind spots that the use of practices and languages of internationalism created over the course of nineteenth and twentieth-century histories within the context of peace activism.

Holger Nehring is Professor of Contemporary European History at the University of Stirling, where he co-directs the Centre for Policy, Conflict and Co-Operation Research (CPPCR). He has published widely on the history of social movements, peace movements as well as on Cold War history. His most recent monograph *Politics of Security* (2013) on the British and West German protests against nuclear weapons is the first archive-based and historical comparative and transnational study of two anti-nuclear-weapons movements.

64 See Steve Breyman: Were the 1980s' Anti-Nuclear Weapons Movements New Social Movements?, in: Peace & Change 22:3 (1997), pp. 303–329; Lars Schmitt: Kritische Wissenschaft und Friedensbewegung: Soziologische Selbstreflexion zur Stärkung der Bewegung, in: Wissenschaft und Frieden 3 (2004), available online at: http://www.wis senschaft-und-frieden.de/seite.php?artikelID=0330 (accessed on 14 September 2015).

65 Margaret R. Somers: Genealogies of Citizenship: Markets, Statelessness, and the Right to Have Rights, Cambridge 2008, p. 175.